FACT SHEET

 Musharraf visit to Camp David

A Balance Sheet

 Released by Muhammed Siddique-ul-Farooque, Central Information Secretary Pakistan Muslim League (N) at a news conference on July 4, 2003

 After meeting with General Musharraf in Camp David on June 24, President Bush announced a $3 billion aid (loan) package for Pakistan, spread over five years, without the approval of US Congress, but linked it with three severe conditions.  It has resulted in freezing of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which is its only dependable shield against possible Indian aggression, and Pakistan’s defense capability has weakened.  Meanwhile, Pakistan is likely to be disgraced before Muslims around the world, as well as the people of Pakistan with dispatch of troops to kill Iraqi citizens in the name of peacekeeping.  India, however, has refused to send its troops to Iraq without UN approval.  A campaign to create public opinion in favor of recognizing Israel has emerged.  Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue has weakened. Hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan is likely to increase.

 

These irrefutable facts have been related in a fact sheet about the outcome of General Pervez Musharraf’s visit to the United States, released on Friday by the Central Information Secretary of Pakistan Muslim League (N), Muhammed Siddique-ul-Farooque.

 

The PML (N) leader said that the most important aspect of General Musharraf’s visit is that Chief Executive having authority to enter into agreements with foreign governments remains in Islamabad, while General Musharraf with no such constitutional authority continues to make agreements.  He is mere chief of the army, and not president of the country under the constitution.

 

The PML leader said that General Pervez Musharraf totally failed in:

 

·        Getting  $1.8 billion American loan waived;

·        Receiving compensation for $10 billion loss suffered by Pakistan economy in the US-Afghan war;

·        Securing an increase in Pakistan’s textile quota;

·        Ensuring relaxation of immigration laws for Pakistani residents.

 

On the other hand, President Bush, who calls Musharraf a friend, had already offered F-16 aircraft to India along with its technology, but turned down Musharraf’s request for the aircraft due to Indian opposition.  Meanwhile, Bush lifted restrictions on transfer of AWACS planes from Israel enabling Tel Aviv to sign sale of AWACS and modern RADAR system to India.  Consequently, Pakistan remains deprived of F-16 warplanes, while India would soon be able to not only enhance surveillance of Pakistani borders, but also observe our defense related activities deep inside the country.  General Musharraf thus failed in strengthening Pakistan’s defense, while India got a boost in its defenses.

 

The enormity of the failures of General Musharraf as compared to achievements of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee can be can judged in the light of the following fact:

 

Musharraf yielded to Bush, made Pakistan a frontline state in the American war against terrorism, and provided bases to American forces, while India refused to become a frontline state and strongly opposed US invasion of Iraq.

 

Expectations

Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri expressed hope in Washington on May 13, 2003 that Pakistan’s $1.8 billon debt would be written off during General Musharraf’s visit.  Musharraf himself stated that he would press President Bush to deliver F-16 aircraft.  The people rightly expected Musharraf to secure compensation for the $10 billion losses that Pakistan suffered due to cooperation with the United States.  The nation also hoped that the US would accord approval to our nuclear program.  Pakistani exporters were certain that Washington would increase the textile quota for Pakistan in return of Musharraf’s enthusiastic support, and the Pakistani traders would enjoy easy access to American markets.  It was hoped that the United States would actively help Pakistan in settling the Kashmir dispute, and the Pakistani residents, now facing difficulties, in the US would be allowed same relaxation in immigration laws as in the case of people from other friendly countries.

 

End Results

Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz and Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar on June 24, and General Pervez Musharraf on June 26 wrongly claimed before Pakistani journalists that the United States had not attached any conditions to the assistance package. However, Musharraf had to admit next day that package was really tied to strings.

 

Speaking at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on June 27, Musharraf said that he would urge the US Congress to approve the proposed package without attaching conditions for its use. He also revealed his conversation with President Bush saying: “I have told President Bush that we prefer our aid to be free of encumbrances. In other words, please don’t do micromanagement.”  Thus General Musharraf admitted that the package was linked with severe conditions, so that when annual installments will be released for specified sectors after congressional approval Pakistan will not be able to spend a single dollar on its own, and will have to follow American directives.

 

The White House spokesman referred to the following conditions in his briefing on June 24 2003:

• Pakistan must continue co-operating with the US in its war against terrorism.
• Pakistan must make a commitment that it is not promoting, and will not promote, onward proliferation of its nuclear weapons technology. 
• Pakistan will stay on course to building a modern and liberal democracy. 

The spokesman also made it clear that Pakistan would be given $600 million after congressional approval, and the second installment would not be released until the Congress was satisfied that Pakistan was abiding by the terms.  In other words, if the Congress felt that Pakistan was neglecting any one of the three conditions, the $600 million installment would not be released.

 

According to renowned South Asia expert Stephen Cohen, if the Congress gave its approval to the aid package then the first installment would be released in 2005. Other known American experts have said, “The aid will not lead to any happy change in the life of a common Pakistani, because the assistance is political rather than economic, and the United States aims to achieve maximum political benefits out of it.”

 Stephen Cohen has called the package “mysterious” saying that it was actually meant to deal with terrorism phenomenon, but the package would come into effect in 2005, and by that time terrorism might be neutralized and the United States might lose interest in Pakistan.

 Conclusion

In brief, General Pervez Musharraf succeeded in personally receiving lots of praises and a pat on the back from President Bush, but failed to secure any concrete assistance or friendly cooperation for Pakistan. Even the thought of political price that he has paid, and is going to pay in future, in return of the so-called assistance package worth $3 billion raises visions of disaster.